Governing by panic: the politics of the Eurozone crisis by Woodruff, David M.
  
David M. Woodruff 
Governing by panic: the politics of the 
Eurozone crisis 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Woodruff, David M. (2015) Governing by panic: the politics of the Eurozone crisis. Politics & 
Society. ISSN 0032-3292 
 
© 2015 SAGE Publications 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63381/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: September 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
Governing by Panic: The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis 
David M. Woodruff 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Abstract 
The Eurozone's reaction to the crisis beginning in late 2008 involved not only efforts to 
mitigate the arbitrarily destructive effects of markets but also vigorous pursuit of policies 
aimed at austerity and deflation. To explain this paradoxical outcome, this article builds 
on Karl Polanyi's account of a similar deadlock in the 1930s. Polanyi argued that a 
society-protecting response to malfunctioning markets was limited under the gold 
standard by the prospect of currency panic, which bankers used to push for austerity, 
deflationary policies, and labor’s political marginalization. This article reconstructs 
Polanyi's theory of "governing by panic" and uses it to explain Eurozone policy during 
three key episodes of sovereign bond market panic in 2010-2012. By threatening to 
allow financial panics to continue, the European Central Bank promoted policies and 
institutional changes aimed at austerity and deflation, limiting the protective response. 
Germany's Ordoliberalism, and its weight in European affairs, contributed to the 
credibility of this threat. 
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1 
Introduction 
 A fundamental, and quite puzzling, contradiction marked Eurozone leaders' efforts 
to deal with the effects of the world financial crisis that began in 2007-2008. On the one 
hand, both the Eurozone as a whole and individual European states sought to prevent 
the transformation of crisis into catastrophe by evading the onset of well-known vicious 
circles. To combat bank runs and the downward spiral of debt deflation, governments 
offered deposit guarantees and bailouts, while the European Central Bank (ECB) 
provided liquidity to the financial sector on an unprecedented scale.1 To avoid a fall in 
consumer prices that would reduce incentives to spend and and thus put further 
downward pressure on prices, the ECB sought to cut market interest rates and increase 
the money supply. Against the tendency of recession to breed more recession as 
spending and investment retrench in reaction to reduced demand, governments 
deployed expanded spending on unemployment support and other automatic stabilizers 
and—in 2009, at least—explicit demand stimulus. Later, Eurozone leaders did not 
simply stand aside in the face of an accelerating feedback loop between falling bond 
prices, higher government interest costs, and the prospects for budget balance. Instead, 
they worked to ease financing constraints for affected national governments. In short, 
national and international policy responses to the Eurozone crisis were replete with 
measures premised on the belief that it would be too costly to allow assets to find their 
own price on markets where pessimistic expectations could feed on themselves. 
On the other hand, accompanying this impulse to reject the sovereignty of the price 
mechanism and to build bulwarks against price collapses was a contradictory impulse—
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one that sought to enforce the sovereignty of the price mechanism and dismantle 
bulwarks against deflation. Above all, a number of governments, pushed by the ECB 
and other European institutions, made efforts to fight high levels of unemployment 
through promoting declines in wages—for instance, by reducing minimum wage rates, 
by decreasing public sector salaries, by reducing unemployment benefits, by weakening 
and decentralizing collective bargaining, and by forcing renegotiation of labor contracts 
in recessionary conditions.2 Meanwhile, fiscal demand stimulus that would have 
moderated downward pressure on wages and other prices was short-lived, and from 
2010 states across Europe pursued austerity, seeking to balance budgets through tax 
rises and spending cuts. Eurozone members also adopted new treaty obligations 
intended to make austerity in reaction to budget difficulties effectively mandatory. 
Thus, Eurozone governments and institutions pursued policies designed at once to 
protect societies from markets and to subject them more fully to them. They used both 
fiscal and monetary policy instruments to ward off vicious circles of declining growth or 
financial implosion, yet did not turn these same instruments to promoting virtuous circles 
of expansion. Rather than a comprehensive victory for the point of view that prices 
cannot safely be left to find their own level, or for the rival claim that maximal price 
flexibility assures rapid adjustment and resumption of growth, one finds a deadlock 
between contradictory impulses. 
This stalemate was not unprecedented. In his 1944 masterwork The Great 
Transformation (henceforth TGT), Karl Polanyi traced the interwar European 
catastrophe to a similar deadlock, one which likewise kept the widely shared impulse to 
protect the social fabric against arbitrarily destructive markets from growing into a 
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successful recovery program. Polanyi located the root of this deadlock in the use by 
bankers of the shadow of financial panic to keep democratic politicians in check. As he 
put it, 
Under the gold standard the leaders of the financial market are entrusted, in the 
nature of things, with the safeguarding of stable exchanges and sound internal 
credit on which government finance largely depends. The banking organization is 
thus in the position to obstruct any domestic move in the economic sphere which 
it happens to dislike, whether its reasons are good or bad. In terms of politics, on 
currency and credit, governments must take the advice of the bankers, who 
alone can know whether any financial measure would or would not endanger the 
capital market and the exchanges. … The financial market governs by panic.3 
On Polanyi's argument, the gold standard endured as long as it did, despite the 
tremendous difficulties it entailed, because financial interests feared the political 
consequences of unorthodox policy by labor governments and wished to retain the 
potential to govern by panic. The end of the gold standard, by making a currency panic 
impossible, meant "the political dispossession of Wall Street." No longer constrained to 
heed the counsel of bankers, governments could launch innovative attacks on economic 
crisis, as the United States did in the New Deal. However, FDR's unilateral decision to 
take the dollar off gold was exceptional. Elsewhere, financial leaders retained their 
capacity for obstruction, and would only agree to abandon the gold standard when labor 
had been politically neutralized.4 
Where the gold standard was still in force, and where a drain of gold arising from 
trade deficits and capital movements threatened convertibility, financial interests used 
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the prospect of panic to push for austerity and deflation. These policies aimed to 
achieve the adjustment of international relative prices, restoring trade balance. They 
were frustrated, however, by a "countermovement," animated by "the principle of social 
protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive 
organization."5 Workers resisted decreases in wages, agriculturalists decreases in food 
prices, and enterprises the destructiveness of a general deflation. Therefore, 
"authoritarian interventionism" in service of "vain deflationary efforts" weakened 
democracy but did not achieve its aim.6 Economically, this led to an incoherent policy 
premised on deflationary aims that could not be attained (and were destructive to the 
limited extent they were). Politically, the direct opposition between economic and 
political power meant an undermining of democracy. Only the demise of the gold 
standard could break the stalemate between the popular principle of social protection 
and the political leverage of financial interests. 
With appropriate but remarkably limited modifications, this article contends, Polanyi's 
arguments about the political and economic consequences of the gold standard can 
explain the puzzling contradictions of Eurozone policy diagnosed above.7 That this 
should be so might well have surprised Polanyi himself. After all, the euro was not 
linked to gold nor even fixed to any external currency. At no point in the crisis was there 
even a remote prospect of a generalized flight from the euro. Moreover, Polanyi's 
account of the agenda motivating the bankers of the Great Depression era to deploy the 
panic weapon was comprehensively archaic by the early 21st century: parties of the 
mainstream left with not the slightest inclination to set the foundation-stones of 
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capitalism a-tremble simply could not provoke the kinds of anxiety among capitalists he 
diagnosed. 
Nonetheless, Polanyi's explanation of how "governing by panic" can limit efforts to 
defend society from market implosions remains highly pertinent to the Eurozone 
experience, for two reasons. First, even after the shift from gold-backed to inconvertible 
currencies, financial panic is an endemic possibility under capitalism. As Eurozone 
sovereign borrowers and their creditors had repeated occasion to observe in 2010-
2012, any fungible, widely held asset such as a government bond is vulnerable to a 
panic if investors believe a general shift in expectations regarding its value is imminent. 
A currency panic is thus only one species of a more general phenomenon.  
An inconvertible currency does, however, offer a central bank an almost invincible 
weapon against panic: the use of money creation to buy up assets and coordinate 
investor expectations about prices. Most students of central banking consider this 
"lender of last resort" role to be a fundamental advantage of the institution.8 But capacity 
to act as a lender of last resort does not entail a willingness to do so. The second 
reason Polanyi's theory proves relevant to the Eurozone crisis is that in its course 
politicians and technocrats could and did use the prospect of financial market panic for 
political leverage. The European Central Bank (ECB), as demonstrated below, 
repeatedly threatened to refuse to serve as a lender of last resort for government bonds 
unless certain policy prescriptions were met. These prescriptions aimed to promote the 
"Brussels-Frankfurt consensus," which substantially recapitulated the financial 
orthodoxy of the 1920s and 1930s in its support for austerity and promotion of the price 
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mechanism.9 Because with the move to the euro national governments had no capacity 
of their own to serve as lender of last resort, they acceded to these demands. 
The result was a new deadlock between social protection and panic-enforced fiscal 
orthodoxy, one that had effects similar to its 1930s analogue. Economically, the 
Eurozone pursued an incoherent effort to at once induce deflation via austerity and to 
fend it off. Politically, what in Polanyi's case was a split between political power and 
economic power became, in the Eurozone case, a split between nationally organized 
political power and transnational economic power channeled by the ECB, again with 
severe consequences for democracy. Even the ECB's eventual acceptance of a lender-
of-last-resort role (in mid-2012) paralleled one path to the demise of the gold standard 
Polanyi described: it happened only after opposition to austerity had been politically 
neutralized, in this case via the drastic curtailment of the budgetary autonomy of 
national states. 
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. The first section reconstructs 
Polanyi's analysis of the economic background of the Great Depression, and of the role 
of "governing by panic" in the political deadlock that ensued, with a particular focus on 
the British case. The second section uses this same case to give Polanyi's argument 
more institutional specificity, focusing on the particular role of central bankers and the 
strategic difficulties they face in credibly threatening to let a market panic rage, and how 
the gold standard enabled such threats. The third section examines the Eurozone crisis, 
describing both a protective reaction and the emergence of an austerity agenda 
enforced through panic. It suggests that in the absence of a gold standard, the capacity 
of the ECB credibly to refuse to serve as lender of last resort depended crucially on the 
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influence of Ordoliberalism on German policy makers and institutions, and discusses 
the political circumstances under which the ECB came to accept a lender-of-last-resort 
role. The conclusion situates the Polanyian explanation in relation to other approaches. 
The Deadlock of the 1930s 
In Polanyi's interpretation, the political and economic disasters of the interwar period 
arose from the intersection between two causal processes. The first was his famous 
"double movement," "the clash of the organizing principles of economic liberalism and 
social protection."10 In practical terms, "economic liberalism" means here the gold-
standard adjustment mechanism linking international trade, wages and other prices, and 
monetary policy, whereas "social protection" encompasses anything that interferes with 
this mechanism. The second causal process was the "conflict of classes," which 
blocked any coherent response to the depression that arose from the malfunctioning 
gold standard's baleful effects.11 Working-class influence in a democratic political 
system blocked a deflationary response, but the strength of capitalists in the economy, 
and in particular the threat of market panic, forestalled a stimulationist one.12 The 
resulting "deadlock" between democracy and markets led to fascism, which was 
avoided only if the gold standard was abandoned before the collapse of democracy. 
The remainder of this section offers a detailed reconstruction of Polanyi's argument. 
The gold standard—the axis around which Polanyi's entire narrative turns—was 
described by Hume in the 18th century as an automatic equilibriating mechanism for 
international trade and prices: prices at an uncompetitive level lead to a trade deficit, 
which gives rise to gold outflows, a consequent decline in the money supply, and thence 
a fall in prices that restores competitiveness and the trade balance. Polanyi saw the 
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effects of allowing the mechanism to operate in this way as manifestly ruinous due to 
the deflation it would often imply. In a context of falling prices, sales may fail to cover 
costs (such as wages) fixed by contract, leaving enterprises "in danger of liquidation 
accompanied by the dissolution of productive organization and massive destruction of 
capital."13 According to TGT, two forms of social protection arose to ensure against this 
sort of arbitrary and unnecessary destruction.14 The first was central banking, which 
offered some flexibility on how, and how rapidly, trade deficits and associated gold 
outflows translated into contractions in the supply of paper currency created against 
gold reserves.15 The second form of social protection applied specifically to the price of 
labor, where "social legislation, factory laws, unemployment insurance, and, above all, 
trade unions …[interfere] with the mobility of labor and the flexibility of wages."16 
The potential deflationary implications of the restored gold standard of the interwar 
period, Polanyi implies, were much greater than those of the 19th century, for the 
relevant currency values required much larger price adjustments to balance trade.17 To 
the extent that central banking or wage-defense mechanisms blocked deflation, trade 
deficits and associated gold drains persisted.18 Polanyi notes two related responses. 
The first was trade protectionism, whether direct or via various forms of exchange 
restriction.19 Keynes, for instance, advocated a protective tariff to avoid abandoning the 
gold standard in the summer of 1931.20 Thus, "the incubus of self-sufficiency haunted 
the steps taken in protection of the currency,"21 and this had cumulative effects in 
reducing international trade.22 The second response to blocked deflation Polanyi 
emphasizes was the spread of international credit, used to finance the balance of 
payments deficit.23 The joint result of these two responses was a waxing of international 
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capital movements as international trade waned.24 However, this "perpetual 
borrowing"25 was doomed to be temporary. Internationalized finance transmitted the 
effects of the U.S. stock market crash to the rest of the world, and international credit 
dried up.26 "The interdependent deficit economies went into an irreversible slide, and 
the whole stabilization structure collapsed."27 
Without credit available to cover the balance of payments deficits, national 
authorities faced a choice between two unappealing options: massive deflation or exit 
from the gold standard. Polanyi's explanation of why the gold standard was not simply 
abandoned to obviate deflation is of particular significance for understanding the politics 
of the interwar tragedy. In part, Polanyi contends, the gold standard's persistence 
stemmed from its role in international economic integration and from its powerful 
ideological sway.28 But another important factor was class conflict, and in particular the 
way in which capitalists regarded the gold standard as a critical weapon in this conflict. 
The gold standard meant that any national currency was vulnerable to collapse in a 
panic: if a sufficient number of currency holders were to demand conversion of their 
notes into gold, convertibility would have to give way. This circumstance, as Polanyi 
argues in the passages quoted at the outset of this paper, gave capitalists substantial 
political influence. When labor parties were in power—as in Britain in 1929-1931 and 
France in 1936-1937—the prospect for capital flight (via conversion of currency) 
ensured capital-holders a veto over radical measures. As long as labor was politically 
potent, Polanyi maintains, capitalists insisted on the gold standard for political, not just 
economic reasons. 
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Polanyi suggests that the gold standard as a source of political leverage was so 
fundamentally important to capitalists because they feared that labor's political power 
represented an existential threat. This was not because a repetition of the Bolshevik 
revolution in Europe was in any regard likely.29 Instead, capitalists feared that labor 
"might disregard the rules of the market which established freedom of contract and the 
sanctity of private property as absolutes." The consequences of this lack of what 
nowadays would be termed credible commitment to capitalism Polanyi describes in dire 
terms that would do any market liberal proud: moves along these lines "must have the 
most deleterious effects on society, discouraging investments, preventing the 
accumulation of capital, keeping wages on an unremunerative level, endangering the 
currency, undermining foreign credit, weakening confidence and paralyzing enterprise." 
This was the source of "latent fear which, at a crucial juncture, burst forth in the fascist 
panic."30 
How the gold standard was made to serve the purpose of limiting labor's freedom of 
political action comes through more clearly when Polanyi's compact discussion of 
relevant cases is fleshed out with further contextual details. In 1936, Polanyi writes, the 
socialist Blum took power in France "on condition that no embargo on gold exports be 
imposed," leaving the panic weapon available.31 Although Blum did devalue the 
currency after coming into office, it remained tied to gold via a specified trading band. 
However, even this was abandoned shortly after Blum resigned in the summer of 1937 
and a new government formed by the middle-class Radicals took power.32 This is the 
background to Polanyi's claim that "once labor had been made innocuous, the middle-
class parties gave up the defense of the gold standard without further ado."33 
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Polanyi asserts that this last statement applies to Britain as well, where he has in 
mind the fall of the Labour government (in August 1931) and the subsequent 
abandonment of sterling's tie to gold (in September). The proximate cause of the fall of 
the Labour government was negotiations over balancing the budget deficit, which had 
been swollen by unemployment support expenditures.34 Trade unions and many 
members of the government wished to accomplish this by raising taxes. Prime Minister 
MacDonald, as well as the Bank of England and the opposition parties, wanted to cut 
unemployment payments (the dole) instead. These discussions took place on the 
backdrop of strong speculation against sterling that left Britain in urgent need of 
international loans, which were solicited from New York bankers Morgan Grenfell on the 
basis of MacDonald's proposal. The bank replied that it could arrange a short-term loan 
only if the budget-cutting proposal could be expected to pass Parliament, and if its 
announcement would reassure the City and the Bank of England. Told of this, Labour 
ministers who opposed MacDonald's proposal resigned, claiming that the government 
was cutting unemployment benefits at the insistence of bankers. MacDonald formed a 
new "national government" with the opposition and pushed cuts in the dole through 
Parliament. The incident became known as the "bankers' ramp" (with ramp being used 
in the obsolete sense of a market manipulation).35  
In TGT, Polanyi pointedly affirms the existence of the "ramp," but focuses on 
Labour's effort to maintain incompatible commitments to high social spending and the 
gold standard.36 An analytically parallel but much fuller account can be found in the 
journalism he wrote as these events were unfolding, in which he argued that "no 
immediate danger threatened the pound in August,"37 and traced the financial panic 
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almost entirely to politics.38 The purpose of the political deployment of market panic was 
to enforce the deflationary solution to the problem of international adjustment under the 
gold standard:  
[Chancellor of the Exchequer] Snowden and the City had resolved to reduce 
unemployment support and to improve the English balance of trade through a 
general reduction in wages and increased export. This was their long-range 
program for defending the pound's gold parity. In order to carry it through, the 
dangers threatening the pound needed to be painted on the wall as luridly as 
possible, in order that the stabilization of state finances—including, to be sure, 
curtailed unemployment support—appeared as the only path to salvation. To 
impose this path on the country under the diktat of foreign bankers was the 
dominant political idea of the August situation.39 
That the conflict over the terms of the Morgan Grenfell loan brought down the 
Labour government illustrated, for Polanyi, the fundamental conflict between 
government by panic and democracy. Alternative measures to address the crisis 
acceptable to Labour's political base—maintaining unemployment payments while 
balancing the budget by higher taxes—were unacceptable to financiers, and the threat 
of capital flight gave the latter's preferences political weight. "The removal of the Labour 
Party from office was meant, like that of the French Cartel in 1926, to lend the pound 
new stability as guarantee against a capital flight driven by tax policy, which would have 
been a completely new phenomenon for England."40 
If in Britain and France financial markets dictated the scope of democratic 
governance, the U.S. case showed the opposite pattern. Polanyi argues that 
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Roosevelt's decision to abandon the gold standard—which he appears to link to FDR's 
idiosyncratic economic views—was a crucial precondition for the success of the New 
Deal, as it accomplished "the political dispossession of Wall Street"41 insofar as Wall 
Street's power rested on the possibility of politically motivated capital flight. 
Thus, Polanyi discusses two paths to the preservation of democracy in the interwar 
period, both of which required exit from the gold standard but relied on distinct political 
formulas. In one, exemplified by the British and French cases, the political power of 
labor was broken via successful financial market pressure on elected officials, giving 
capitalists the political comfort they needed to allow the surrender of the gold standard 
and with it the powerful threat of capital flight. (Polanyi doesn't rate the "democratic" 
character of the resulting system very highly, but formal democracy was preserved.) 
The other possibility was the pre-emptive abandonment of the gold standard by 
democratic politicians, as accomplished in the United States. Democracy and the 
market economy were rendered compatible a radical reduction in the influence of either 
labor or capital. 
When both labor and capital retained power, however, the result was "deadlock" 
and "a social catastrophe of the Continental type."42 Polanyi describes this catastrophe 
only in relatively general terms, with little discussion of concrete cases. However, he 
includes Brüning (German chancellor 1930-1932) among politicians who pursued a 
deflationary policy to protect the gold standard,43 and the German case clearly lies 
behind many of his more general descriptions. As Polanyi summarized, "in the course of 
these vain deflationary efforts free markets [were] not restored though free governments 
[were] sacrificed."44 Brüning's use of Presidential decree power to back deflationary 
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policies would, for Polanyi, have been a clear instance of the "authoritarian 
interventionism" that "resulted in a decisive weakening of the democratic forces which 
might otherwise have averted the fascist catastrophe."45 
To sum up, then, Polanyi's view of the gold standard crisis: given the downward 
rigidity of prices, the gold standard ensured persistent trade imbalances, which could 
endure so long as international credit was available. But once credit became scarcer 
after the collapse of the U.S. stock-market boom, either the gold standard itself had to 
give way or prices in trade-deficit countries had to fall. The gold standard, though, was 
strong, for reasons both political—by amplifying the danger of financial panic, it served 
as a bulwark against socialist policies—and economic, as the basis of international 
economic integration. When for these political or economic reasons the gold standard 
endured, the austerity agenda needed to push down prices could only happen if the 
vociferous objections of labor were suppressed. This undermined democracy and paved 
the way for fascist coups. 
 
Political Use of Market Panic: Some Preconditions 
Polanyi's insights into the way the prospect of market panic can become a political 
weapon, I will argue below, shed a great deal of light on the course of the Eurozone 
crisis. Before turning to this argument, however, it is worth exploring in greater depth the 
preconditions for the 'weaponizing' of market panic and the circumstances in which 
these preconditions are likely to obtain. 
Financial panic is often straightforwardly and convincingly described as a 
coordination dilemma between owners of some liquid asset.46 If the asset owners 
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maintain their holdings, the value of the asset remains stable. If they all try to sell it, the 
value sinks sharply. An asset holder that fears a general sell-off ought to try to sell first, 
but if all act on this logic they produce a price collapse as a self-fulfilling prophecy. As 
long as some sort of binding general agreement between asset-holders is not possible, 
each asset holder must regard apprehensively any information that could induce other 
asset holders to sell.47 
That the prospect of financial panic stems from a lack of coordination among 
financial market participants indicates an ambiguity in Polanyi's claim that "the financial 
market governs by panic." Who, exactly, does the governing? An authoritative 
representative of asset holders tasked with ensuring their interests could presumably try 
to brake panic dynamics rather than pursue any sort of broader political agenda. There 
are two paths out of this analytical difficulty. One, on which Polanyi implicitly relies, is to 
suggest that asset holders have shared aversions to particular economic policies (such 
as taxation of the wealthy to fund unemployment insurance). Even without explicit 
coordination, they can be expected react in parallel ways to the prospect of the 
introduction of such policies, creating the preconditions for panic, which thereby 
becomes an effective political constraint.48 Whether this causal mechanism is plausible 
depends on concrete circumstances, but certainly it is not always the case that policy 
preferences among asset holders are of a sufficiently general, coherent, and absolutist 
character for it to operate.49 
There is, however, a second means of political instrumentalization of market panic. 
An actor (such as a central bank) with the capacity to coordinate expectations—to fuel 
or calm panic fears—may also attempt to derive political leverage from this fact. This 
16 
possibility is indeed illustrated by the British case that Polanyi analyzed. As the 
sustainability of sterling's peg to gold came into question in the summer of 1931, the 
Bank of England had the task of calming market fears by selling gold reserves, and 
arranging international lending to supplement these reserves. However, Bank leaders, 
especially Deputy Governor Ernest Harvey (who ran Bank policy during much of the 
period), were not reticent in impressing on politicians a particular interpretation of what 
would calm the markets or make foreign credit available, stressing budget balance 
above all.50 Eventually, Harvey shut down intra-Labour bargaining over how to deal with 
budget deficits by warning of an imminent exhaustion of gold reserves (while ruling out 
raising interest rates as an alternate way of preserving them), apparently deliberately 
seeking to bring about a government collapse.51 This had the effect of strengthening the 
hand of those who favored spending cuts rather than progressive tax rises as a means 
to balancing the budget.52 Even Harvey's final decision to abandon the gold standard 
was an effort to force the government to cancel an impending election he feared 
(incorrectly) that Labour would win.53 This was very much an effort to "govern by panic," 
but an effort mediated through the specific institutional agency of the central bank. 
Understanding the important co-ordinating role of a lender of last resort in facilitating 
"governing by panic" weakens Polanyi's case that the abandonment of the gold 
standard should eliminate the phenomenon. For a currency panic is not the only sort of 
panic in which the threat to withhold last-resort lending might become politically 
relevant. As Minsky has convincingly argued, capitalism will continually create the 
preconditions for panics that operate analogously to bank runs, ensuring the permanent 
relevance of the lender-of-last-resort role.54 Polanyi, however, has very little to say on 
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the subject of bank runs and other financial crises not linked to gold convertibility. He 
merely notes the danger that the gold standard might mandate "fatal monetary 
stringency in a panic."55 This remark suggests that Polanyi may have discounted 
financial panic's continued political relevance because he had no particular reason to 
expect that a central bank, absent a gold constraint, would refuse to calm the waters 
when necessary. The rise of central banking reflected, after all, part of society's self-
defense against the self-regulating market's arbitrary destructiveness. 
Although Polanyi did not bolster this position by analyzing the strategic interactions 
of central bankers and politicians, such an analysis might appear to reinforce his case.56 
A central bank can use the prospect of market panic as a tool of political influence only 
if it can make a credible threat to allow the panic to happen.57 Under the gold standard, 
the credibility of this threat comes from the fact that the central bank can in fact lose a 
battle to avoid a flight from the currency when gold reserves are exhausted (though 
even in these circumstances shrewd central bankers may seek to maximize their 
influence by concealing the panic-fighting capacities they do have available, as Harvey 
probably did).58 Without the gold standard, allowing a panic when fiat money could 
prevent it would seem to have consequences too extreme to make it a credible threat. 
There are thus two reasons one might contend that the demise of the gold standard 
would eliminate the use of looming market implosion to impose political decisions: one 
could share Polanyi's optimism that it would free central bankers to defend society 
against the arbitrary destructiveness sown by panic, or one could suggest that absent 
an inflexible gold constraint no threat to permit a panic would be believed. As the next 
section shows, the re-emergence of governing by panic in the course of the Eurozone 
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crisis demonstrated that both contentions are misleading: Central bankers proved to 
have a political agenda distinct from Polanyi's societal self-protection, and inflexible 
ideas about rule-governed action served as a strategic substitute for the inflexibility of 
the gold standard. 
 
The Deadlock of the 2010s 
The early 21st century plight of the Eurozone displays resonant parallels with 
Polanyi's description of the deadlock of the 1930s, but there are also significant 
differences. The economic prelude to the Eurozone crisis was a period of large intra-
European trade imbalances. As in the 1920s, ample credit made these trade 
imbalances easy to fund. The analogy is not exact, though. Polanyi viewed international 
credit as disrupting the self-adjusting mechanism the gold standard was designed to 
enable, slowing down relative price adjustment. In the Eurozone, international credit did 
not merely slow price adjustment, but actually exacerbated price disparities. The 
introduction of the Euro meant that the European Central Bank set a single interest rate 
for all Eurozone countries. However, cross-country distinctions in inflation rates did not 
disappear. This meant that real interest rates were different in different Eurozone 
countries. In low-inflation countries real interest rates were high, while in high-inflation 
countries real interest rates were low. Thus, the Eurozone's single interest rate had a 
pro-cyclical character—delivering monetary stimulus to the higher inflation countries, 
and monetary restriction to the lower inflation in countries.59 Cross-country financial 
flows were one way these monetary effects worked themselves out. Credit flows thus 
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not only compensated for trade imbalances, but actually drove relative price movements 
in a way that intensified, rather than relieving, these imbalances (see Figure 1).60 
Figure 1: Cumulative consumer price level (HICP) change since 2000 
 
Source: ECB 
Germany was central to these developments. For low-inflation Germany, the 
Euro's introduction was recessionary, exacerbating an already difficult unemployment 
situation. Germany did not react to the recession by seeking to launch a program of 
domestic fiscal demand stimulus. This was more or less out of the question under the 
Maastricht criteria: even the action of automatic stabilizers meant that Germany was 
breaching these criteria by 2003.61 Instead, Germany initiated labor-market reforms (the 
Hartz IV and Agenda 2010 initiatives) that facilitated the creation of low-wage jobs. At 
the same time, those parts of German industry subject to collective bargaining began a 
long period of wage restraint. In a closed economy, policies to hold wages down have 
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limitations as a growth strategy, insofar as wages are also the source of demand. But in 
an open economy, wage restraint's damping effect on domestic demand may be 
compensated for by export demand—assuming export markets are growing.62 But this 
was just the situation the pro-cyclical character of Eurozone monetary policy created: 
Germany's Eurozone trading partners were benefiting from substantial monetary 
stimulus, the magnitude of which grew with their inflation rates. Rising wages in some 
Eurozone countries made the citizens more able to buy German exports, and at the 
same time made wage-earners less competitive compared to German ones. It is no 
surprise, then, that German exports surged and trade balances on the Eurozone 
periphery went sharply negative. Trade deficits were funded by lending from German 
banks recycling export earnings.63 
This pattern of international financing came to an abrupt halt in the autumn of 
2008, but it was to have an important legacy thereafter. The run-up to the Eurozone 
crisis saw the accumulation of multiple forms of what Minsky termed "financial fragility," 
fueled by international credit.64 Borrowers in trade-deficit countries, including the 
governments of those countries, came to rely on the continued availability of incoming 
financial flows. Banks on the other side of these transactions could thus only be assured 
of receiving expected repayments as long as general credit conditions remained easy. 
Meanwhile, in two Eurozone countries, Ireland and Spain, a boom emerged in housing 
markets. Low Eurozone interest rates were probably a facilitating condition in kicking off 
the booms, though not a sole explanation (Portugal and Italy did not see similar booms). 
They were fueled by the classic Minskyian collateral appreciation-credit easing cycle, 
backstopped by the recycling of German export receipts. The resulting economic growth 
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swelled tax revenues, and the fiscal position of the two countries became much 
stronger—but also more fragile, in that the positive fiscal balance implicitly relied on the 
speculative finance that was fueling the housing booms.65 
From the Crisis to a New Deadlock 
Thus when the "elastic band snapped,"66 and international credit conditions 
tightened overnight, the financial fragility that had emerged over the course of the euro's 
first decade meant that the conditions for debt deflation and financial panic were very 
much in place. The effects of the financial crisis hit Europe in two stages. In the first, 
which began as early as 2007 but intensified massively after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, the crucial issue was financial fragility in the banking 
sector. Some European banks had become heavily reliant on the US financial system 
both for liabilities and for assets, and the implosion of the markets for short-term credit 
and securitized sub-prime mortgages pressured both sides of their balance sheets and 
threatened their imminent financial ruin, which might well have led to a general collapse 
of the European financial system.67 There was no "fatal monetary stringency" in the face 
of this panic, though. The ECB made ample credit available.68 However, this dealt 
primarily with the liabilities side of balance sheets and had only a limited effect in 
stopping the collapse of asset values, whether of exotic mortgage-backed securities 
from the US or simply of housing prices in Ireland and Spain. On this background, 
national governments across Europe took steps to bail out their banking sectors, such 
as Ireland's decision to offer a state guarantee of its banks' liabilities.69 
Despite these measures, and parallel ones in other large markets like the US and 
UK, this first phase of the financial crisis was also accompanied by a huge fall-off in 
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demand. Here, too, European governments were not passive. Late 2008 and early 2009 
saw a significant expansion in deficit spending, including the operation of automatic 
stabilizers and some explicit demand stimulus; Germany's demand stimulus package 
was the most significant, though perhaps the least advertised.70 
In broad, then, the Eurozone's initial reaction to the crisis was the sort of protective 
countermove that Polanyi would have expected. Rather than accepting the catastrophic 
consequences of letting labor, money, or risk find their price on an imploding market, 
fiscal and monetary policy sought to modify or reverse price pressures. Nonetheless, a 
second phase of the financial crisis began after the revelation of the extent of Greece's 
debt problem in late 2009. The hallmark of this new phase was a sudden and large 
jump in interest-rate differentials between Eurozone sovereign borrowers, with the so-
called periphery (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy) paying dramatically higher 
rates.71 The financial fragility facing fiscal authorities became manifest as refinancing of 
sovereign debt in the market on acceptable terms became difficult or even impossible. 
Because interest payments were an important component of government spending, the 
danger of self-fulfilling market predictions of debt unsustainability (pessimism breeding 
higher interest rates breeding deeper pessimism) became significant.72 Meanwhile, 
weak sovereign debt prices created additional dangers for the financial system; holdings 
of peripheral debt were heavily concentrated in Germany and especially France.73  
Again, Eurozone authorities did not simply step aside and watch asset prices reach 
levels that would have bred financial collapse via rapid debt deflation and sovereign 
defaults in the face of market panic. From May 2010, the ECB expanded lending to 
banks and began intervening in sovereign debt markets to hold down interest rates.74 
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Concentrated in the peripheral countries where banks were facing the greatest 
difficulties, ECB lending served as an alternative source of financing for these countries' 
trade deficits, compensating for the "sudden stop" of private financing.75 Multilateral 
arrangements, worked out in a large number of Eurozone or broader EU summit 
meetings, provided fiscal support, including for banking rescues, in Portugal, Ireland, 
and Greece.76 This international response greatly exceeded the limited multilateral 
interventions that had sought to shore up the gold-standard system, and provided forms 
of support that had been all but absent in the earlier period.77 
The post-crisis protective response from the Eurozone thus in many ways 
outstripped its interwar predecessor in vigor. But this response was nonetheless limited 
and riven with contradictions in ways remarkably analogous to those Polanyi describes. 
As domestic demand in the peripheral countries shrank or stagnated, reducing trade 
deficits via increased exports was a requisite of growth. But such an expansion was 
difficult to achieve. Like the gold standard, the euro had no adjustment mechanism for 
international trade imbalances other than deflation—the very deflation protective 
measures worked against. If trade deficit countries could not regain competitiveness via 
downward price adjustment, then the only way their price levels could sink relative to 
those of the trade surplus states was if the latter's prices rose more quickly. However, 
there were no policies in place to promote this. ECB policy pushed against outright 
deflation, but remained very far from promoting a level of inflation that would facilitate 
the emergence of substantial cross-country differentials in inflation rates (see Figure 1). 
Indeed, the leaders of Germany, with by far the largest intra-European trade surplus, 
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explicitly and repeatedly rejected this route to rebalancing.78 By early 2014, only Ireland 
had seen any substantial adjustment of prices against the German benchmark.  
The protective countermove was also limited by intensive efforts—described further 
below—to ensure that assistance of all sorts was conditional on implementation of 
liberalization and austerity measures intended to promote competitiveness by 
increasing price flexibility, especially for wages.79 Anti-deflationary monetary policy was 
thus combined with pro-deflationary fiscal and reform policy. The broad pattern can be 
seen in Figure 2. While the trends vary somewhat by country, a turn from fiscal stimulus 
to austerity was taking place as early as 2010, somewhat compensated by expansive 
monetary policy.  
Figure 2: Evolution of Eurozone Budgets, Money Creation, and Unemployment 
Source: ECB 
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The Strategic Power of Neoliberal Ideas: the Brussels-Frankfurt Consensus 
and Ordoliberalism 
The Eurozone, in sum, was experiencing a deadlock between deflationary and 
protective impulses analogous to the one Polanyi described—and with analogous 
political origins, as this section demonstrates. The political parallels between the two 
periods arose because the key elements of Polanyi's causal mechanism found 
functional substitutes in the 2010s. The role of capitalist fear of labor radicalism was 
played by the neoliberal "Brussels-Frankfurt consensus,"80 strongly entrenched in the 
European Central Bank. ECB pursued this neoliberal agenda by threatening to allow a 
self-sustaining market panic unless their conditions were met. As for the role of the gold 
standard in making such threats credible, here the functional substitute stemmed in part 
from the institutional structure of the Eurozone, which gave Germany an effective veto 
over many of the measures needed to promote the protective reaction. The thorough 
embedding of Ordoliberalism, the particular German variant of neoliberalism, in 
Germany's institutions and policy-making culture made the prospect that this veto would 
be used credible.81 The strategic power of Ordoliberalism derived from the central role 
of rule-bound action in this policy approach.82 Because Ordoliberalism offered resources 
to justify even catastrophic consequences in an individual case by citing the broader 
benefits of rules, actors with a commitment to Ordoliberalism could credibly threaten to 
veto policies required to ward off market panic. Both the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus 
and Ordoliberalism have loomed large in a number of previous explanations of 
Eurozone crisis-fighting policy83 The distinctive contribution of a Polanyian interpretation 
is to show how the prospect of market panic was crucial to establishing the influence of 
these two closely related sets of ideas. 
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The Brussels-Frankfurt consensus can be compactly identified with attachment to 
stable money, sound finances, and efficient local-factor markets, especially labor 
markets.84 Ordoliberalism, while it encompasses these three elements, has additional 
commitments that require somewhat longer description. Ordoliberalism is a specific 
variant of neo-liberalism that emerged in Germany in the inter-war period and received 
canonical formulation in the post-WWII era, especially in the works of Walter Eucken 
and Franz Böhm.85 Like other market liberals, Ordoliberals extolled the role of the price 
system in coordinating economic action. To make the price system work they advocated 
market competition: businesses and individuals struggling against one another to make 
sales to sovereign consumers. However—and the point is crucial to the entire 
Ordoliberal project—the economic system cannot be counted on spontaneously to 
evolve to ensure this outcome. Only state action will bring it about.86 Thus, compared to 
the Austro-American version of neoliberalism more familiar outside of Germany, 
Ordoliberalism offers a much more unambiguous and less conflicted embrace of the 
role of the state in giving order to a market economy.87  
Nonetheless, Ordoliberals, like other market liberals, sought to ensure that state 
powers necessary to underpin markets were not turned to purposes of which they did 
not approve. To this end, the economy should be governed by an "economic 
constitution" which should ensure that the state's actions are constrained to take the 
form of general rules, an Ordnungspolitik or ordering policy.88 In this, the spirit of 
Ordoliberalism partakes of the continental or Roman approach to law (also known as 
civil law), which emphasizes the role of exhaustively codified rules and rejects the 
situational judgment characteristic of the common law approach.89 The mandate for 
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Ordnungspolitik and pre-codified rules, like the proscription of case-by-case decision, 
were intended to limit the scope of action available to democratic governments, 
complicating efforts at rent-seeking by ruling out exceptions for particular situations, 
industries, or professions.90  
Ordoliberalism's legal philosophy did not enjoy unchallenged sway in post-war West 
Germany. Ordoliberal theory had to compromise with a corporatist praxis it could not 
fully encompass nor defeat, a compromise encapsulated by the well-known "social 
market economy" formula.91 Nonetheless, its influence was far from negligible. For 
instance, a constitutional change was required before West Germany could begin a 
brief and limited experiment with contextually responsive demand stimulus in the late 
1960s.92 Ordoliberal ideas had particular (though not exclusive) influence in shaping 
West Germany's negotiating approach to European Monetary Union, and had much to 
do with the rule-based character of the resulting Maastricht treaty.93 In 1993, a decision 
by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on a challenge to the 
Maastricht treaty had the effect of entrenching an Ordoliberal interpretation of its 
meaning.94 The decision defended the treaty against the claim that by denuding 
German voters of sovereignty it violated democratic principles by arguing, in the spirit of 
Ordoliberalism, that constraints on democratic governments could promote good 
economic governance.95 
The court further argued that the provisions of the treaty were sufficiently well 
specified to grant European institutions determinate authority, any exceeding of which 
would require treaty modification and thus a new democratic imprimatur. In the 
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meantime, the court declared, European decisions found to supersede treaty 
authorizations would not be binding on German institutions.96 
After the financial crisis, rules and institutions inspired by Ordoliberalism became 
entangled in a well-known dilemma: strictly rule-bound behavior runs the risk of 
producing perverse consequences in an individual case for which the rules are poorly 
suited. Ordoliberals do not seem to have grappled with the dilemma on this level of 
abstraction, but their texts suggest they were "rule consequentialists."97 Rule 
consequentialists resolve the perverse consequences dilemma by arguing that the 
consistent operation of properly chosen rules will have beneficial consequences that 
outweigh any undesirable outcomes arising from the application of rules to a particular 
case. In a political economy context, such reasoning is regularly encountered in the 
discussion of soft budget constraints and moral hazard, discussed in Ordoliberalism as 
the problem of proper assignment of liability to market actors. Such arguments generally 
contend that the attractions of mitigating some particular economic disaster must be 
resisted due to the broader consequences of allowing market participants to expect 
such mitigation, which can promote profligacy and excessive risk-taking.98 In the same 
vein, Eucken also makes a more general argument for "constancy in economic policy" 
to avoid discouraging long-term investment.99 The beneficial consequences of rule-
bound action are asserted and the possible situational advantages of policy change (for 
instance, preserving existing long-term investments, as Polanyi suggests) are not 
discussed. 
Carried to an extreme, a consequentialist defense of a rule based on its general 
effect might be able to justify disregarding the unpleasant consequences of almost any 
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individual application whatsoever.100 But this is not the only way a rule consequentialist 
might react to a difficult case. Another possibility is to combine an exception in the 
individual case with an effort to craft a system of rules ensuring that such difficult cases 
do not arise in the future. Foucault ascribes to Ordoliberalism two key elements, the first 
being its attachment to the rule of law. The second element is its "policy of society," 
which Foucault portrays as an effort to diffuse the capacity to compete in markets 
through society, ensuring that society will not generate demands to restrict market 
competition.101 Conceiving of Ordoliberalism as a rule-consequentialist approach helps 
to understand the relationship between these two elements. The "policy of society" 
helps to ensure that that rigid rules implied by the Ordoliberal vision of the rule of law 
subordinated to markets will not give rise to intolerable consequences in practice. 
A brief consideration of Germany's domestic policy response to the financial crisis in 
2007-2009 can illustrate the insights made possible by understanding Ordoliberalism as 
involving an ambition to a form of market-promoting governance bound by rules but that 
avoids disasters. Germany faced both a demand crisis and a financial crisis. It reacted 
to the first with extensive demand stimulus, and the second by a mixture of guarantees, 
subventions, and nationalizations. These reactions did not in the least reflect the 
application of pre-existing policy rules, but were rather extemporized and legitimated by 
highly context-specific legislation.102 In this light, it is tempting to see a gulf between 
Ordoliberal rhetoric and practical policies, with invocations of the former little more than 
a public-relations dodge.103 This position, however, overlooks substantial changes in 
forward-looking rules that were bundled with contextual crisis-fighting measures. The 
most important of these was a constitutional "debt brake," sharply limiting federal 
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budget deficits and banning provincial (Länder) governments from running deficits 
altogether.104 This constitutional change eliminated the reference to "overall economic 
equilibrium" as an aim of budget policy that had been introduced in the 1960s to 
authorize Keynesian policies.105 It ensured that demand stimulus would be limited in 
time, while also complicating explicit or implicit backstopping of the regional public 
banks (Landesbanken) by Länder governments. At the same time, aid to Landesbanken 
was conditioned on major restructuring.106 These institutional changes were, then, 
entirely in the spirit of Ordoliberalism, restructuring rules and the actors subject to them 
in ways designed to facilitate the operation of a market economy and make further 
discretionary interventions both unnecessary and unavailable.107 
The Political Use of Bond-Market Panic 
It's now possible to analyze how Ordoliberalism intersected with European 
institutions and the prospect of market panic may to produce a deadlock between the 
protective countermove and austerity. Three crucial decision episodes—in April-May 
2010, late summer through autumn 2011, and summer 2012—illustrate the relevant 
dynamic (see Figure 3). In each case, spiking interest rates on sovereign bond markets 
prompted a sense of crisis among European political leaders, who were well aware of 
the potentially disastrous impact on the banking system.108 And in each case, the ECB 
eventually used its power to create money to help calm markets. First, however, the 
ECB leadership implicitly or explicitly threatened to withhold its help unless policy or 
institutional changes implementing Brussels-Frankfurt priorities (especially labor market 
liberalization and fiscal austerity) were adopted. These threats were made credible by 
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the rigid rules on the ECB's independence and mandate, and the prospect of vigorous 
German political and legal opposition to exceeding that mandate.109 
Figure 3: Rates on 10-year Government Bonds (monthly averages) 
Source: ECB 
 
Episode 1: Enforcing austerity, April-May 2010. After the revelation of the depth of 
Greece's budget problems in late 2009, European leaders debated whether and how to 
support the country throughout the spring of 2010. In the last week of April, with these 
discussions still uncompleted, a panic broke out on European sovereign bond markets 
in the aftermath of rating agency downgrades, with very large spikes in interest rates on 
Irish, Portuguese, and especially Greek debt, and noticeable spikes in rates for Spain 
and Italy. Falling bond prices raised major difficulties not only for the governments most 
directly affected, but also for banks, many of them French and German, which held 
these bonds as assets.110 Given the serious prospect of a broader financial panic, in 
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early May the leadership of the ECB took a contentious internal decision to use 
purchases of sovereign bonds to calm the markets. A second, simultaneous decision, 
though, was less contentious: to postpone announcement of the market intervention 
until after European leaders had created their own plan to address the bond crisis. The 
rationale for the delay, which was very explicitly advanced in the ECB's internal 
deliberations, was that were the ECB to act immediately it would remove the panic's 
pressure on Europe's leaders to come to an agreement on crisis measures of their 
own.111 
At a meeting with European heads of state on May 7, 2010, ECB President Jean-
Claude Trichet described the bond-market panic in dire terms, advocating a rescue fund 
financed by European governments and a program of budget austerity.112 He also 
communicated that adoption of these measures was a precondition for ECB market 
intervention.113 The credibility of the implied threat that the ECB would sit on its hands if 
it did not get its way, despite a market situation Trichet had portrayed as desperate, was 
clearly tested during the ensuing discussion. Trichet flatly rejected the insistence of 
French president Nicolas Sarkozy and others that ECB begin intervention, affirming the 
bank's absolute independence of action.114 The evidence strongly suggests that 
institutionalized Ordoliberalism was an important reason that this intransigence could 
seem more than bluff. German Prime Minister Angela Merkel invoked the Maastricht 
treaty in Trichet's defense, and (albeit apparently in another context) mentioned the 
possibility that the Bundesverfassungsgericht would reject any actions inconsistent with 
the treaty.115 Two subsequent events illustrate how institutionalized Ordoliberalism—in 
particular, the shadow of the Bundesverfassungsgericht's Maastricht decision—meant 
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the threat of ECB inaction might well have been viewed credibly. First, when the ECB 
did subsequently begin sovereign bond purchases the Bundesbank seriously 
considered refusing to implement the program on the grounds that it was not authorised 
by the relevant treaties.116 Second, in 2014 the Bundesverfassungsgericht did indeed 
declare a later bond-market intervention program not authorised by treaty and thus at 
variance with the German constitution.117 At a minimum, Trichet's interlocutors in May 
2010 would have had every reason to suppose that the he would face a severe 
challenge in winning internal ECB agreement to bond purchases, and that achieving 
policy changes congenial to the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus that dominated within the 
Bank were necessary to overcome this challenge. 
In the event, Eurozone leaders categorically affirmed their commitment to budget 
austerity, and pledged to create (with help from the IMF) a rescue fund, the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), to aid Greece and other distressed sovereign 
borrowers (with austerity conditionality a given). The ECB, in turn, launched direct bond 
market purchases to support prices and lower interest rates, and greatly widened its 
liquidity provision to the financial system in ways that served to ameliorate banks' losses 
on sovereign debt.118 It bears noting that there is no plausible chain of reasoning under 
which the effectiveness of either of these monetary policy interventions depended on 
austerity. Their bundling with austerity was the result of a deliberate political decision on 
the part of the ECB leadership. Trichet was not the only actor pushing for this result; this 
was also the preferred approach of the German and some other governments. 
Nonetheless, the negotiating history sketched above strongly suggests that the ECB 
played a pivotal role in bringing about this outcome. The ECB's monopoly on money 
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creation meant it was able to offer something that the governments participating in the 
negotiations could not. 
Thus, in this episode, as in Britain in 1931, market panic facilitated central bank 
pressure on politicians for austerity policies. The most immediate effect was in Spain, 
where Prime Minister Jose Rodriguez Zapatero returned from the Brussels summit to 
announce sweeping new austerity measures, reversing a prior commitment to 
Keynesian stimulus.119 For Greece, Portugal, and Ireland market panic abated only 
briefly after the ECB's May intervention. The restrictive rules under which the EFSF was 
created meant that the EU, ECB, and IMF "Troika" administering its programs had an 
even more manifest capacity to credibly threaten to abandon countries to the market 
maelstrom unless its demands were accepted. The contradiction of this form of policy-
making with democracy was pronounced.120 Both in Greece and in Portugal, EFSF 
programs were made conditional on pledges from parties not in government, to ensure 
that they could not be overturned by elections.121 In Ireland, the government party that 
agreed to the ESFS package was all but destroyed in a subsequent election, but absent 
alternative sources of funding the new government found itself equally constrained.122 
 
Episode 2: disciplining Spain and Italy and constitutionalizing austerity, August-
December 2011. The pattern set by the Eurozone's responses of 2010 was reiterated in 
the latter half of 2011. The evidence indicates that ECB leaders not only threatened to 
allow bond market panic to rage if their preferred policies were not adopted, but also in 
fact did carry out this threat. 
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Disciplining Spain and Italy. From the summer of 2011, Spain and Italy began to 
experience spiking interest rates (see Figure 4). On August 5, Trichet sent letters to the 
Italian and Spanish governments describing what was needed to "restore the 
confidence of investors."123 Both letters called for intensified austerity, labor market 
reforms, and a liberalizing reorganization of collective bargaining. Although neither letter 
mentioned the prospect of further bond-market intervention from the ECB, it was clear 
even from immediate press reports that the letters were widely being understood as 
setting out preconditions for such intervention.124 In both cases, the governments 
responded with alacrity to the suggestions, quickly announcing efforts to implement the 
recommendations in their entirety, though without specifying their origins in detail. 
Figure 4: Bond Prices and ECB Intervention, 2011-2012 
 
Source: 10-year benchmark bond prices from Datastream; SMP purchases from ECB 
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Intervention in the market for Spanish and Italian bonds began on Monday August 8. 
Although the ECB clearly intended to calm the markets, it was pursuing two 
contradictory goals. For investors seeking a new focal point, the predictability of ECB 
bond purchases would have facilitated coordination. However, predictable purchases—
for instance, committing to a target interest rate for bonds by analogy with successful 
interventions into currency markets—would have made modulating interventions to 
discourage unwelcome policy developments impossible.125 In the event, the ECB did 
not take even minimal steps to offer a credible commitment to support bond prices.126 
Facing a choice between mollifying markets and intimidating politicians, the ECB opted 
for the latter.127 This conclusion is supported not only by the ECB's public statements, 
but also by patterns of its bond purchases. (Figure 4 shows the volume of ECB 
purchases, which are available only as weekly totals and are not broken down by 
country.) For three weeks through October, the bank did little intervention, despite a 
sustained run-up in prices, during a period when Berlusconi's government was having 
trouble winning parliamentary accession to the measures announced in August.128 
When prices jumped in early November, interventions intensified but remained well 
below the volumes that had proved effective in the summer. It may be, as one observer 
believes, that the dip in purchases in the second week of November was intended to 
allow bond prices to reach levels ensuring Berlusconi's resignation, first promised on 
November 8.129 In any event, evidence is strong that domestic politicians who wished to 
install a technocrat congenial to the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus arranged 
Berlusconi's defenstration.130 And it is unarguably the case that the ECB leadership did 
not pursue bond market intervention aggressively when bond prices were at their 
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highest level, and made clear its desire to deploy its resources only to support those 
governments that adopted its desired policies. Meanwhile, the resignation of another 
German ECB representative in September highlighted political conflict over even the 
limited bond-buying that was done, reinforcing the prospect that the ECB would indeed 
stand aside despite market panic if its demands were not meant.131  
 
Constitutionalizing austerity. Through the same period, Eurozone leaders debated 
other issues as well, including how to reform and expand the EFSF. Germany's 
institutionalized Ordoliberalism again played an important role, especially in a struggle 
between France and Germany over potential alternate means by which the power of 
money creation could be harnessed to tame market panic. Sarkozy suggested that the 
European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) that was to succeed the EFSF be given a 
bank license; this would allow it to borrow from the ECB. Germany resisted the proposal 
on the grounds that it would amount to monetary financing of governments. In 
September, the German Constitutional Court ruled that while German participation in 
the EFSF was legal, any further extension of German commitments required 
parliamentary approval.132 By late October, Sarkozy abandoned the bank license plan, 
ending his insistence the measure be included in an agreement that Merkel would have 
to take to the Bundestag.133 Sarkozy tried a different approach in early November, 
proposing with US backing that the IMF use its money-creation powers to create 
Special Drawing Rights, some of which could be contributed to the EFSF via European 
countries. Again Germany objected; Merkel cited Germany's constitution in refusing to 
overrule the Bundesbank's objection to the plan.134 
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Thus, the ECB maintained its autonomy to decide when and whether newly created 
money could be used against market panic. Mario Draghi, who took over as head of the 
ECB from November, publicly specified a precondition for intervention: adoption of a 
"fiscal compact" proposed by France and Germany.135 This would tighten budget deficit 
targets, and also require governments to give these targets a maximally constitutional 
character involving automatic correction, on the model of the German "debt brake." For 
the Germans, it represented "the extension of the ordoliberal paradigm … across the 
EU."136 Heads of government agreed on the outlines of the compact at a summit on 8-9 
December. The compact itself made use of the threat of market panic as a disciplinary 
mechanism, since countries that did not ratify it would not be eligible for ESM 
support.137 As the leaders were meeting, Draghi announced plans for a massive 
expansion of cheap long-term loans to EU banks on 8 December. Banks could pledge 
sovereign bonds as collateral for these loans, of which nearly €500 billion were made at 
the end of December, allowing them to serve as an alternative to direct ECB bond 
purchases. 
 
Episode 3: a conditional end to panic. As noted above, Polanyi argued that when the 
political leverage afforded by panic was no longer necessary, financiers and their 
political allies could abandon the gold standard. By the summer of 2012, advocates of 
the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus had reached an analogous situation. The fiscal 
compact and other changes in European arrangements had sharply limited the 
autonomy of governments. Meanwhile, indirect support via lending to banks had proved 
insufficient to restrain a new spike in interest rates on Italian and Spanish bonds (see 
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Figure 3). It was at this point that Draghi positioned the ECB to become a true lender of 
last resort for the sovereign bond market, pledging to deploy unlimited resources 
against speculators betting on the exit of any country from the Euro.  
The political context and significance of this decision are clearly revealed by the 
history of its development.138 Although the Open Monetary Transactions (OMT) program 
allowed for unlimited bond market intervention, this could only be done on behalf of 
countries that had agreed to a rescue program under the ESM and accepted the 
associated conditions. Defending the OMT proposal to a German audience, ECB 
director Jorg Asmussen promised that it would involve more effective conditioning of 
bond purchases on reforms than had been achieved in the case of Italy.139 This 
conditionality was key in winning the backing of German leaders for the plan.140 At the 
same time, Draghi noted that the plan was directed "a 'bad equilibrium,' namely an 
equilibrium where you may have self-fulfilling expectations that feed upon themselves 
and generate very adverse scenarios."141 Thus, OMT embodied a contradiction between 
creating certainty for markets (by promising unlimited intervention to prevent self-
fulfilling expectations) and uncertainty for governments (by threatening that intervention 
would end if conditions were not met). Nonetheless, the potentially unlimited character 
of OMT and Draghi's statement that bond markets could be driven not only by expected 
fiscal and economic developments but also "fear and irrationality" amounted to a 
significant new commitment to combat market panic.142 The introduction of the OMT 
was the moral equivalent of the end of the gold standard: an explicit rejection of the 
sovereignty of financial markets. The dramatic subsequent decline in Eurozone bond 
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prices (see Figure 2) strongly suggests that bond purchasers themselves welcomed this 
rejection. 
Conclusion 
At the end of 2014, economic output in the Eurozone was still 1% below its level in 
2007, and was only expected to equal the 2007 level at the end of 2015. These lost 
eight years compared unfavorably even with the Great Depression. During this period, 
policy-makers used both fiscal and monetary policy instruments to ward off vicious 
circles of declining growth or financial implosion, yet did not turn these same 
instruments to promoting virtuous circles of expansion and avoid austerity. As late as 
2014, Draghi found himself at once announcing deflation-fighting measures and 
defending deflation's necessity for adjustment.143 In short, there was a very deep 
intellectual incoherence at the core of the Eurozone's reaction to the crisis.  
The virtue of a Polanyian analysis is that it accounts for this paradoxical outcome, 
illuminating its political roots in the use of market panic as a tool to eliminate the space 
for democratic choice about economic policy. Despite the operation of institutions and 
attitudes reflective of Polanyi's protective countermove, the joint effect of the Brussels-
Frankfurt consensus and German Ordoliberalism, politically empowered by the 
irreplaceable role of the central bank as a tool against market panic, was to push 
austerity and deflationary adjustment. "The market" did not demand these policies. (A 
particularly revealing incident in this regard occurred in early 2012, when the credit 
rating agency Standard & Poor's downgraded the bonds of a number of European 
states because of fears that austerity could become counterproductive due to the 
contraction of demand.)144 The collapse in Eurozone interest rates after the introduction 
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of OMT decisively illustrated once again what had long been obvious: there was no 
direct connection between data on budget deficits and growth prospects and the mood 
of the markets. Eurozone debt as a share of GDP continued to grow even as interest 
rates plummeted. There is no sense in which the austerity agenda was imposed by 
market forces; it was a political choice that governing by panic was used to implement. 
Of the traditional explanatory triumvirate of ideas, and institutions, interests, this 
explanation emphasizes the first.145 If the thinking behind the Brussels-Frankfurt 
consensus had been less deeply embedded in European institutions, if Ordoliberalism's 
rule-consequential style of thinking were less prevalent in Germany, a deadlock could 
have been avoided and breakthrough to sustained stimulus would have been 
possible.146 
Institutions were not irrelevant. Treaty provisions and the veto power Germany held 
over many potential actions at the European or Eurozone level contributed to the 
credibility of the ECB threat to stand aside in the face of market panic. However, these 
institutions only facilitated the pursuit of particular aims; they did not specify these aims. 
Flexibility was possible. The extensive creation of new treaty arrangements (such as the 
fiscal compact) in the course of the crisis, as well as the ECB mission creep involved in 
its detailed policy recommendations and adoption of a lender-of-last resort role, 
illustrate the potential flexibility of the rules. The possibilities for approving more 
extensive deficit spending created by treaty references to "structural" deficits could have 
been exploited to a much greater extent than they were.147 There is no sense in which 
the austerity agenda was imposed by European or Eurozone institutions; it was a 
political choice. 
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As for interests, this was certainly a case where they did not "come with an 
instruction sheet."148 Consider two of the relevant interests often cited. The politicians of 
creditor countries, such as Germany, could have focused on the benefits of stimulating 
demand for exports rather than on the costs of bailouts. And the taming of the bond 
market panic after 2012 suggests that the options for addressing financial-sector 
difficulties were certainly not limited to austerity. 
Despite the disasters it chronicles, it is possible to read TGT in an optimistic vein: 
the spastic crisis-fighting innovations of the interwar period could be the harbingers of a 
new form of enlightened economic management; the demise of financial panic as an 
ultima ratio in class conflict would reveal that tensions between markets and democracy 
were not inherent to these two institutions. As Polanyi put it elsewhere, "as soon as the 
credit system is based no longer on 'confidence' but on administration, finance, which 
rules by panic, is deposed, and sanity can prevail."149 But elimination of the gold 
standard proved very far from eliminating the importance of confidence to the financial 
system, and very often what counted as sanity to those in charge of administering 
monetary policy embodied many of the market liberal ideas Polanyi had criticized.150 
The Eurozone crisis was only one of many episodes since the second world war 
demonstrating the continuing relevance of the political dynamic Polanyi so astutely 
diagnosed, in which the agencies with the capacity to stem financial panic took 
advantage of desperate circumstances to push a neoliberal agenda.151 This history fails 
to bear out Polanyi's post-war optimism, but it does confirm again the enduring genius 
of The Great Transformation—a fact that would be cold comfort to Polanyi, as it should 
be to those who share his values. 
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